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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err when it failed to recognize the 16th Section line as the Section 12
boundary, and allowed extrinsic evidence to determine the boundary line?

2.

If the trial court did not err, does sufficient evidence support the trial court's findings as
to the Section 12 boundary?

3.

Does sufficient evidence support the trial court's determination that no public right-ofway exists along the sixteenth line of the Section 12 Property?

4.

Does sufficient evidence support the trial court's determination that a county road did
not exist along the western boundary of the Section 18 Property thereby precluding
Roller's traditional access to his property from the south?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to continue the trial so that Don
Anderson could testify regarding the county road along the west edge of the Section 18
property?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of a deed, if it is unambiguous, is a question of law. Gillmor v.

Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994).

144729 1

1

The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
Gillmore v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995); Hancock v. Planned
Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990). The trial court's findings of fact are
clearly erroneous if they are not supported by sufficient evidence. Gillmore, 904 P.2d at 706.
Finally, a district court's refusal to continue a trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah App. 1994); see
Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b). "[I]n determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this
court must review the reasonableness of the trial court's decision, and should not disturb the
decision unless it was "clearly unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. at 299 (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah
1964)).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105
Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b)
Utah R. Civ. P. 45(h)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
INTRODUCTION
Roller and Godfrey own adjoining dryland farms in northwest Cache County, Utah.
These farms cover property that includes quite mountainous terrain. These farms are accessed
through various county roads, public rights-of-way and private easements, very few of which
are paved or maintained in great detail.
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Koller bought the relevant property in 1967 from Lillie Thompson. One section (the
"Section 12 Property") comprises the southeast quarter of Section 12, Township 14 North,
Range 2 West. Roughly, Godfrey owns the north half of the southeast quarter of Section 12,
Koller owns the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 and a third party, Glen
Thompson, owns the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12.
In the northwest corner of the southeast quarter of the Koller Section 12 Property is a
metal watering trough (in the shape of a very large barrel, cut in half lengthwise) that was used
to water horses and cattle since the land was first homesteaded in the late 1800's.
Since the settling of the Section 12 Property, the adjacent property owners and any
members of the public could access that trough along a public right-of-way that travels
east/west along the border between the Thompson property on the south and the Godfrey
property on the north (the "Section 12 Right-of-Way"). For illustrative purposes only, a
diagram of the property is attached as Attachment "l". 1 The Section 12 Right-of-Way has
never been abandoned. To the contrary, subsequent deeds of the various adjacent properties
acknowledged and attempted to preserve it.
Furthermore, as illustrated on the drawing in Attachment " 1 " , Koller owns the
northwest quarter of Section 18, Township 14 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Godfrey owns the southwest quarter of Section 18. Together, these properties
constitute the Section 18 Property. Below Section 18 is Section 19. A county road (7200
West) runs north/south along the west edge of Section 19 by a residence owned by Don
Anderson. Mr. Anderson's residence is located in the southwest corner of Section 19

1

In fact, this diagram was used by the court for illustrative purposes. (Record at 386—10-11).
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(illustrated by three small squares in Attachment "1"). Since at least 1946, that county road
(the "Section 18 County Access Road") continued north along the west edge of the Section 19
Property and along the west side of the southwest quarter of the Section 18 Property. The
county road ended at the midpoint line that divides the north and south halves of the Section 18
Property.
At various times since 1967, Koller accessed his Section 18 and adjoining property by
way of this county road to haul out the wheat he farmed on his property. In some instances,
given the nature of the terrain and the little to no formal maintenance of the county road,
runoff water would flood the road and make it impassable. When the water drained, however,
Koller once again used the county road.
The public, including Mr. Koller, enjoyed unobstructed access along both the Section
12 Right-of-Way and the Section 18 County Access Road until the late 1980's, when Godfrey
attempted to obstruct access along both properties and change the Section 12 Property line.
This lawsuit followed. At trial, the district court ruled that the evidence did not support either
a Section 12 Right-of-Way or the Section 18 County Access Road. Further, the district court
changed the Section 12 boundary line so that it did not conform to the sixteenth line which
divides the Godfrey property on the north from the Koller and Thompson property on the
south.
Koller, through his trial counsel, filed a motion for a new trial based on additional
evidence located after the trial of the matter. This motion sought to introduce language
describing the Section 18 County Access Road which was located after trial in the microfiche
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archives of the unpublished Utah Supreme Court decisions. The language from the decision
reads as follows:
appellants filed an answer claiming a prescriptive right to travel along a roadway he
averred was an established road which left his land where it adjoined respondents'
eastern boundary and then crossed respondents' land in a general southwesterly
direction to the southwest corner thereof where it entered a county highway extending
in a northerly and southerly direction along the west side of respondents' property
[Section 18 Property].
Roller's motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal follows.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Section 12 Boundary Line and Right-of-Wav
1.

In 1897, Mary Jardine acquired the north half of the Section 12 Property from

the United States government. The description of the property was prorated, meaning that it
granted to Ms. Jardine literally the north half of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Trial
Record at 386—229, hereafter "Record").
2.

In 1918, the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 was

transferred to the Godfreys, but not using a prorated description. Instead, it was transferred
using a metes and bounds description. (Record at 386—225-30).
3.

Specifically, the transfer of the northwest quarter was done in the following

manner:
Beginning 80 rods north and 80 rods west of the southeast corner of the
southeast quarter of Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake
Base and Meridian running thence west 80 rods, thence north 80 rods, thence east 80
rods, thence south 80 rods.
(Record at 386-225-226).
4.

The deeded description places the southern boundary of the Godfrey property 23

feet from the original boundary identified in the prorated deed. It places the boundary of the
144729 1
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Godfrey property 23 feet north of the 16 section line, the line that divides the north half of the
southeast quarter of Section 12 from the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 12.
(Record at 386-224-27; PL's Trial Exhibit #1).
5.

In 1935, the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 was

transferred to Elmer Bingham. (Record at 386—114, 229-30; Deposition of Glen Thompson,
dated February 17, 1993 at 6, published at Record at 387—475-76, hereafter "Thompson
Dep."; PL's Trial Ex. # 103 at 2). Currently, it remains described in a prorated fashion, not
in a metes and bounds fashion. (Record at 386—230). In fact, all of the properties
surrounding the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12 have all been
transferred using prorated descriptions. (Record at 386—230).
6.

In 1945, Kenneth and Peru Thompson, the owners of the southeast quarter of

the southeast quarter of Section 12, transferred that sub-quarter, using a prorated deed, to
Wendell Thompson. (PL's Trial Ex. # 102 at 2). The deed also transferred "title and interest
of grantors to a steel watering trough . . . said watering trough being situated in the Northwest
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 12." (PL's Trial Ex. # 102 at 2).
7.

In addition to identifying the trough inside the southeast quarter of the southeast

quarter of Section 12, the deed also notes that the grant of interest to the trough was "subject .
. . to all rights heretofore given to other persons to water stock at said steel watering trough,
together with necessary rights of ingress and egress thereto." (PL's Trial Ex. # 102 at 2).
8.

Two days before the transfer to Wendell Thompson, Kenneth and Peru

Thompson granted to Glen W. Thompson access rights to the same steel trough. The language
reads in relevant part:
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The right to water livestock consisting principally of work animals at a steel watering
trough situated in the Northwest corner of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 12 . . .together with the right of ingress and egress to said steel
watering trough for the purpose of carrying the right hereby granted into effect, it being
understood and agreed that this right is not exclusive, but is to be exercised in
connection with similar rights of other parties and subject to reasonable care to avoid
unnecessary interference with the rights of other parties to a like service.
(PL's Trial Ex. #102 at 1).
9.

Also in 1945, Koller purchased the property that includes Sections 7 & 8 of

Township 14 North, Range 1 West. (See Attachment " 1 " ; Record at 386—112-13). The
western side of Section 7 is contiguous to the eastern side of Section 12. (Record at 386—113;
Attachment "1").
10.

In 1967, Koller purchased the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of

Section 12 from Wendell Thompson. (Record at 386—107; Attachment "1").
11.

At the time Koller purchased the property, a road ran from the west side of the

midline of the southeast quarter of Section 12 to the steel watering trough near the actual center
of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (See App.'s Ex. #233, see Record at 386—106-107,
200). The trough was situated north to south, and was put in place in 1924 or 1926.
(Thompson Dep. at 10).
12.

On the east side of the watering trough, was a grain drill. (Record at 386—106-

107; Ex. 233).
13.

Just north of the northern end of the drill is where the boundary line had

traditionally been that separates the Godfrey property on the north and the Koller property on
the south. (Record at 386—105, 117; Ex. 231, 233). It constitutes the dividing line between
the north and southern halves of the southeast quarter of Section 12 (identified as the 16th line),
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and is located approximately 10 feet north of a square pipe that has been implanted near the
northwestern edge of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at
386-82, 116-119, 234-35; Ex. 231, 233).
14.

There are remnants of a fence running east/west from the square pipe to a point

approximately 10 feet west of the southern end of the steel trough, and Godfrey claims his
property extends south to that fence line. (Record at 386—118-19, 223; Ex. 228, 230-33).
15.

The result, however, is that Godfrey's claimed possession line is located nearly

10 feet south of the 16th line, and nearly 33 feet south of the line described in his deed's metes
and bounds description. (Record at 386—238).
16.

Approximately ten feet west of the steel trough was the boundary line that

separates the Roller property on the east from the Thompson property on the west, thus placing
the steel trough inside the Roller property, or the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of
Section 12. (Record at 386—116-17).
17.

A fence ran north/south along the east edge of the southwest quarter of the

southeast quarter of Section 12 (the Thompson property) and there was a gate in that fence just
south of the steel trough so that the trough could be accessed from Thompson's property.
(Thompson Dep. at 21).
18.

The boundary line dividing the Godfrey and Roller properties in Section 12 was

surveyed by Randy Lamarr Bott and his partner Don Williams, in approximately 1989. Mr.
Bott was hired by Godfrey to settle the issue of the border between Roller and Godfrey on that
Section 12 Property. (Record at 386—40, 46).
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19.

The last time Mr. Bott and Mr. Williams went to the property, they met both

Koller and Godfrey at the "east terminus of the center, of the east/west center line of the
southeast quarter of Section 12" at a railroad tie that had been implanted there. (Record at
386—48, 59). The railroad tie had been implanted at the east terminus of the middle of the
southeast quarter of Section 12, and was agreed upon by both parties as the eastern dividing
line between the north and south halves of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at
386-60).
20.

To arrive at the location, Godfrey, Mr. Bott and Mr. Williams drove east from

7300 West on a "roadway" that divided the Godfrey property on the north and the Thompson
property on the south. (Record at 386—48-49). The roadway began from 7300 West on the
west side of the southeast quarter of Section 12 and went easterly until it approached the steel
watering trough and drill. It ran the length of the border dividing the Godfrey property on the
north and the Thompson property on the south. (Record at 386—48-49, 71-72, Ex. 233, 227).
21.

On a prior occasion, Mr. Bott and Mr. Williams had tied in their survey

beginning point with the county survey, which was done by Preston Ward prior to that time.
As a result, they located the section corner marker for the northeast corner of Section 12 and
shot the line from that point south to where they were at the railroad tie. They were aided by a
fairly well established fence that went north/south along the eastern edge of Section 12.
(Record at 386—56-57). They determined that the railroad tie was not on the actual eastern
edge of Section 12, but in fact, was west of that line.

Nevertheless, they determined that the

railroad tie was on the east/west line that divided the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter
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of Section 12 from the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12, and they
determined that point to be the 16th Corner. (Record at 386—60-61, 73).
22.

Mr. Bott opined that the county corner marker was a reliable marker from

which to determine the relevant boundary. (Record at 386—76).
23.

Once they tied the county corner marker to the railroad tie, Mr. Williams left

the others and drove west along that east/west, 16th line into the southwest quarter of section
12. (Record at 386—62-68). Mr. Williams and Mr. Bott flagged various posts along the 16th
line using their surveying equipment. (Record at 386—71-72, 116-117; Ex. 227).
24.

Roller and Godfrey were the two to actually drive the posts into the ground.

Mr. Bott then proceeded to place flags or ribbons on each post. (Record at 386—105-106,
116-117; Ex. 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233).
25.

One post was placed just north of the steel trough, and was later replaced by

Roller with a large telephone pole. (Record at 386—204-205). Roller placed the telephone
pole at that location so that it could be identified from the east end of the 16th line, i.e., the
railroad tie. The rolling hills located on the property made the various points along the 16th
line impossible to see from one end to the other. (Record at 386—203).
26.

The 16th line went from the railroad tie on the east to just north of the steel

trough. At the trough point, the line was north of the fence that divided Godfrey and
Thompson property. In other words, upon arriving just west of the steel trough, along the 16th
line, a fence appeared to jog to the south about ten feet. (Record at 386—82, 116-117; Record
at 387—460-61; Thompson Dep. at 9, 16-17; Ex. 231, 233). After jogging south about 10
feet, the fence then continues to the west until it connects with a square pipe that has been
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implanted in the ground on the western edge of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter
of Section 12. (Record at 386—118-19, 245-46; Record at 387—263, 374; Thompson Dep. at
9, 55-56; Exhibit "3" of Thompson Dep.).
27.

The line, including the flagged posts, as they were placed west of the steel

trough, created a boundary line running parallel, approximately 10 feet north of the fence and
square pipe. (Record at 386-118-19, 223, 245-46; 460-61, 409; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit #1).
At the time, it was Roller's understanding that the flagged property line constituted the
boundary between the Koller and Thompson property on the south, and the Godfrey property
on the north. (Record at 386—68, 119-20, Record at 387—460-61). In fact, Koller had
farmed his property to that line since purchasing the property in 1967. (Record at 387—42627).
28.

Just west of the steel trough was a gate dividing the Thompson property on the

South from the Godfrey property on the north. This gate was in existence at the time the
Rollers purchased the Section 7 property in the 1940's and was used by Koller to access his
property on multiple occasions. (Record at 386—121-23; Record at 387—265, 285). On
multiple occasions, Koller personally used the Section 12 Right-of-Way to reach a county road
(7900 West), on the north side of the fence line that lined the north edge of the Thompson
property. (Record at 386—122-23; Record at 387—456). Furthermore, it was used at various
times by others to haul grain out of the Koller fields located east of the road. (Record at 386—
124-26; Record at 3 8 7 - 265, 285, 423, 455-56).
29.

In fact, since the property was homesteaded, the public, including Ken

Thompson, Glen Thompson, Sam Whitney and others, used the Section 12 Right-of-Way to
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access the trough to water their horses and other animals, and to access a log home (originally
owned and used year round by the Whitneys) that was located just east of southeast corner of
Section 12. (Record at 386—122-23, 125-26, 140-141; Record at 387— 423, 456; Thompson
Dep. at 11-12, 27, 36-37; Exhibit "1" of Thompson Dep.).
30.

Access along the Section 12 right-of-way was never impeded until 1988 or

1989, when Godfrey tried to close access. (Record at 387—265, 443; Record at 388—588).
The Section 18 County Access Road
31.

Also in 1967, Koller purchased the northwest quarter of Section 18, Township

14 North, Range 1 West. (Record at 386—113-14; Record at 387—445). He purchased this
property from the estate of Wendell Thompson. (Record at 387—288). The Section 18
Property is contiguous to the southwest quarter of Roller's Section 7 property. (See
Attachment "1").
32.

The southwest quarter of Section 18 was originally owned by Don Anderson,

until Godfrey purchased it some time in the late 1980's or early 1990's. (Record at 387—289).
The Koller and Godfrey Section 18 properties are collectively referred to as the "Section 18
Property." Below Section 18 is Section 19. The southwest quarter of Section 19 is owned by
Don Anderson, and the southwest corner of the southwest quarter contains his resident
homestead. (Record at 386—128; Record at 387—274-76; PL's trial exhibit 328; See
Attachment "1").
33.

Along the west edge of Section 19 is a county road (7200 West) that runs

north/south. (Record at 386—129-130). When Koller bought the Section 18 Property in 1967,
the road (7200 West) continued north from the northwest corner of Section 19, along the west
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edge of the southwest quarter of Section 18 until it ended at the southwest corner of Roller's
Section 18 Property (the road is referred to as the "Section 18 County Access Road". (PL's
Trial Ex. # 328 showing road from north to south down to Anderson residence on the east). It
was Roller's and others' understanding that the entire section of road was a county road.
(Record at 386—128-30; Record at 387—291; Record at 388—590).
34.

Aerial photographs taken in 1946, 1959 and 1966 show how the county road,

7200 West, traveled north along the west side of Section 19 and up to the middle of the west
edge of Section 18 where it ended at the beginning of the northwest quarter of Section 18
(Roller's property). (Record at 387-286-87, 289-93; PL's Trial Ex. 10 & 12).
35.

Furthermore, the trial judge noted, but would not receive, a county map which

showed the same 7200 West road traveling north and ending at the Roller Section 18 Property.
(Record at 387-330-31).
36.

Roller and others used that road continuously since prior to 1967 for various

reasons to gain ingress and egress to his portion of the Section 18 Property. It was a wide and
fairly well-packed road. (Record at 386-132-33, 138-39; Record at 387-265, 281, 283, 285,
423, 457, 459).
37.

In fact, when Roller purchased both the Section 12 and Section 18 properties,

there were only two access routes, one along the Section 12 Right-of-Way, and one along the
Section 18 County Access Road. (Record at 388—588).
38.

Roller alleged at trial that Godfrey suddenly halted all access of ingress and

egress through both the Section 12 Right-of-Way and the Section 18 County Access Road
beginning in the late 1980's. This lawsuit was filed on August 11, 1992.
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MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
When appealing a district court's factual determinations, the appellant must first
marshall all the evidence in favor of the court's findings, and thereafter show why those
findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. See Slattery v. Covey & Co., 857 P.2d 243,
246 (Utah App. 1993). As most of the issues addressed below require that Koller marshall the
evidence, it will be done in the Argument section in the order each applicable issue is
addressed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The unambiguous deeds to the northeast and southeast quarters of the southeast quarter
of Section 12 transfer the property in a prorated fashion. They each transfer a quarter piece of
the southeast quarter of Section 12. As such, the dividing line between the two properties is
the section line which is identified as the 16th Section line. The trial court should have declared
the 16th Section line to be the appropriate boundary, without referencing parole evidence.
However, the trial court erred by looking beyond the unambiguous language of the deeds.
However, at trial, Godfrey argued that a fence constituted the boundary line. This
fence allegedly ran from the east terminus of the 16th Section line straight in a southwesterly
direction to a steel pipe that Godfrey's own surveyor agreed was ten feet south of the 16th line.
Godfrey never claimed, nor presented evidence, of boundary by acquiescence or boundary by
agreement. Nevertheless, the trial court erroneously concluded that this "fence" line
constituted the appropriate boundary. Substantial evidence does not support the trial court's
decision.
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In addition, in the northwest corner of the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of
Section 12 is a large steel watering trough. At trial, KoUer presented evidence that for years, a
road ran east/west from the steel trough to the western edge of the southeast quarter of Section
12. This road was used by the public to access the watering trough with animals, as well as to
access a homestead located southeast of the trough. No one disputed this evidence. Instead,
Godfrey claimed that the roads had since been closed.
Utah law recognizes public rights-of-way over roads used by the public for at least ten
years. This Section 12 Right-of-Way was used by the public for many more than ten years,
and was never abandoned. Utah law further provides that a public right-of-way continues until
formally abandoned by the proper authorities. The Section 12 Right-of-Way was never
abandoned. As a result, it continues to this day regardless of Godfrey's attempt to farm over
it. The trial court determined that no public right-of-way exists along the Section 12 Right-ofWay. Substantial evidence does not support the courts finding.
Finally, Koller presented evidence at trial that a county road exists along the western
edge of the Section 18 Property. This Section 18 County Access Road, which is a northern
extension of 7200 West that ends where the Koller Section 18 Property begins, was evidenced
through aerial photographs, a county map, and testimony by Koller.
In addition, on the second day of trial, Koller intended to call Don Anderson as a
witness regarding the Section 18 County Access Road. Neither party subpoenaed Mr.
Anderson. However, Godfrey listed him as a "will call" witness, and Koller had confirmed
his attendance by telephone. Also, Godfrey's counsel represented to Roller's trial counsel that
Godfrey would call Mr. Anderson as a witness. Koller relied on that representation.
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Mr. Anderson appeared in court to testify. Yet, after waiting in the courthouse for
some time, during one of the breaks, counsel for Godfrey spoke with Mr. Anderson, and
thereafter Mr. Anderson left the building. Koller was unable to locate him.
Koller informed the trial court that Mr. Anderson was a key witness regarding the
Section 18 County Access Road, but the trial court would not continue the trial so that Mr.
Anderson could testify. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to do so.
In summary, the trial court erred in its determination as to the Section 12 Property
boundary, and substantial evidence does not support the court's factual findings respecting the
Section 12 Right-of-Way and the Section 18 County Access Road. Furthermore, the trial court
abused its discretion when it failed to continue the trial so that Mr. Anderson could testify
regarding the Section 18 County Access Road. The Court should vacate the judgment of the
trial court and remand the case for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE
BOUNDARY LINE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE APPLICABLE DEEDS.
The district court erroneously found that the points marked as ABC on Defendants'

Exhibit " 1" constituted the boundary line between the Godfrey property on the north and the
Koller property on the south in the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12.
(Record at 304). Specifically, the trial court found:
25.
There is a square pipe imbedded in the ground at approximately Point A
on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. This square pipe replaced a wooden post in the exact
same location and the post and pipe in succession have been in the present location of
the square pipe for more than [sic] eight (80) years last past.
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26.
The square pipe at Point A on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 marks the
recognized boundary between the Northwest Corner of the Clark Property and the
Southwest Corner of the Godfrey Section 12 Property.
* * *

30.
The Court finds that the ABC Fence line marks the historical and
recognized boundary between the Godfrey Section 12 Property on the North and the
Koller Section 12 and Clark Property on the South.
(Record at 304, 305).
The unambiguous deeds, however, demonstrate that the property line dividing the
Godfrey and Koller properties in the southeast quarter of Section 12 is the 16th line that
traveled straight from the railroad tie on the east to the west side of Section 12. This section
line does not contain a "jog", but rather is a straight line that crosses the middle of the
southeast quarter of Section 12 and connects with the western edge of the southeast quarter of
Section 12 approximately 10 feet north of the square pipe that constitutes "Point A" on
appellees' trial Exhibit No. 1.
Godfrey never disputed that the Section 12 Property was originally granted by the
United States government using references to the government's official survey. Koller
acquired his portion of Section 12 by way of a prorated deed that transferred to him the
southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at 386—107; PL's Ex. #101,
1 7). The deed is unambiguous. The north boundary line is the section line that divides the
north half from the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (PI. 's Trial Ex. #101).
In addition, the deed granting the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section
12 to Godfrey also uses a prorated deed. (Record at 386—230, PL's Ex. #103 at 2). That
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deed is also unambiguous. The south boundary line is the section line dividing the north half
from the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (PL's Trial Ex. #103).
"If a deed description is unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law." Gillmor
v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). Furthermore, it will be interpreted
without resorting to extrinsic evidence. Id.
Applied to the present case, as the unambiguous language of the deeds demonstrates,
there is no question that the proper boundary between the Godfrey and Koller properties in
Section 12 is the line dividing the northern from the southern half of the southeast quarter of
Section 12, i.e. the 16th section line. The trial court erred when it failed to recognize the clear
deed descriptions as designating the 16th section line as the boundary.
II.

FURTHERMORE, EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR, THE
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DETERMINATION OF THE SECTION 12 PROPERTY BOUNDARY LINE.
A.

The Deeds Transferred the Relevant Property in Prorated Fashion.

At trial, three surveyors testified regarding the location of the 16th section line. Two of
the three (Wayne Crow and Keith Hansen) testified that the 16th section line traveled west from
a railroad tie that was located on the east terminus of Section 12 and ended on the west side of
the southeast quarter of Section 12 approximately ten feet north of a square pipe that was
imbedded close to the west side of the southeast quarter of Section 12. (Record at 386—23435; Record at 387-394).
The third surveyor, Randy Lamarr Bott, testified that the 16th line went from the
railroad tie on the east, through the steel trough and to the square pipe on the west. (Record at
386—96). The problem with Mr. Bott's testimony, however, is that he could not recall much
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of the events of his own survey. First, he admitted that he surveyed the property nine years
before trial. He testified as to the events that took place, but only in the abstract. He testified
that he marked the boundary, but could not recall what items he used to mark it. (Record at
386-66).
Second, when shown a photograph of the area, Mr. Bott could not recall with certainty
any of the area or items shown in the picture. (Record at 386—79-80). Third, the results of
his survey were never introduced at trial. Instead, he testified wholly from memory. In fact,
when he was questioned regarding possible discrepancies between the 16th section line and the
square pipe, he stated: "I can't remember exactly because it didn't seem like that there was a,
a difference, a conflict in those points." (Record at 386—96). The core of his testimony was
that he could not really remember. (Record at 386—96-97).
Both Wayne Crow and Keith Hansen, on the other hand, placed the 16th line within one
foot of each other and about ten feet north of the square pipe. (Record at 387—394; Record at
386—245-46). They performed their surveys more recently than did Mr. Bott, they were hired
one by each of the parties to the case, and at least Mr. Crow's actual survey results were
admitted into evidence. This evidence, together with the deeds to the Godfrey and Koller
properties in Section 12, unambiguously establish the dividing boundary at the 16th line.
The clear weight of the evidence placed that line from the railroad tie on the east to a
point about ten feet north of the square pipe on the west. The trial court's finding that the 16th
line went from the railroad tie to the square pipe was clearly erroneous and not based on
sufficient evidence. Thus, the Court should reverse the trial court's findings as to the
boundary between the Koller and Godfrey properties in Section 12.
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B.

Witness Testimony Supports the Survey Results of Mr. Crow and Mr.
Keith Hansen that the Boundary Line is the 16th Section Line.

In addition to the deed and survey evidence, Glen Thompson testified (via published
deposition) that many years ago, a fence began at the railroad tie, traveled west to the west
side of the steel trough, then jogged south about ten feet, and continued west to the square
pipe. (Thompson Dep. at 9, 16-17). Koller also testified of the jog in the fence line. (Record
at 386—116-17). A ten-foot jog to the south in the fence line is inconsistent with a straight 1611^
section line. In other words, where the 16th line is a straight line, and to get from the railroad
tie to the square post historically involved a jog to the south ten feet, the square pipe cannot
possibly lie in line with the 16th section line.
Godfrey called three witnesses who testified that there was no "jog" in the fence line,
but rather that the fence went straight from the railroad tie, over the middle of the steel trough,
and to the square pipe. (Record at 387—344-45; Record at 388— 490, 526). These witnesses
were Godfrey himself, his son Lamont, and his brother-in-law Dee Hansen. (Record at 387—
337; Record at 388—490, 526). This testimony does not establish, however, where the 16th
line is, but rather the alleged position of a fence, which Godfrey alleges to constitute the
property line. Even assuming Godfrey's claim that the fence line went straight from the
railroad tie to the square pipe is true, it does not establish the fence line as the 16th line, and to
the extent that it does not conform to the 16th line, it cannot constitute the correct boundary.
Such a finding would place the 16th section line diagonally in a southwesterly direction.
Instead, the 16th line, as established in the deeds and determined by those qualified to identify
it, constitutes the correct boundary.
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C.

Godfrey did not Allege Boundary by Acquiescence at Trial, and even if He
had, the Evidence Presented Fails to Establish the Necessary Elements.

The trial court found that the fence line constituted the boundary between the Roller
and Godfrey Section 12 properties, a finding directly contrary to the unambiguous deed
descriptions. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law further suggest boundary
by acquiescence in establishing the relevant boundary. (Record at 303-305). However,
Godfrey never alleged boundary by acquiescence at trial, and furthermore failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish it.
First, the trial court merged all pleadings into a final pretrial order. (Record at 225).
The Pretrial Order makes absolutely no mention of any claim by Godfrey for boundary by
acquiescence. (See Record at 224-26). More important, Godfrey made no mention of it at
trial. Second, even if such were properly pleaded, Godfrey did not present sufficient evidence
to establish that the ABC fence line constitutes a boundary by acquiescence.
To establish a boundary by acquiescence, Godfrey must show:
(i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a period of at least 20 years, (iv)
by adjoining landowners.
Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1996). Godfrey failed to present sufficient
evidence of boundary by acquiescence. In fact, he did not even attempt to put on evidence of
any of the four required elements. As a result, the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous
when it determined the boundary to be located on the ABC line instead of the 16th Section line.
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D.

The Court's Determination of Boundary by Agreement is not Supported by
Substantial Evidence.

Finally, the trial court found that Koller and Godfrey "agreed" to the ABC boundary
line as the boundary between the Godfrey and Koller Section 12 properties. (Record at 305306). The evidence does not support such a finding.
A boundary by agreement, like any other contract, requires consideration. See Staker
v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 n.4 (Utah 1990). Here, however, Godfrey did not put on
any evidence of consideration. Koller consistently claimed that the boundary line was the 16th
Section line as provided for in the deeds. (Record at 386—105, 117). Thus, no evidence
supports the trial courts finding that the parties somehow agreed upon the ABC line as the
appropriate section line. The Court should reverse the trial court's finding in this regard.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT NO PUBLIC RIGHT-OFWAY EXISTS ALONG THE SIXTEENTH LINE OF THE SECTION 12
PROPERTY LACKS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
The trial court found no evidence to support Roller's claim that a public right-of-way

exists across the southern boarder of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section
12. (Record at 307). Dee Hansen testified that he cultivated the northwest quarter of the
southeast quarter of Section 12 down to the fence line that constitutes the AB line on
Defendants Exhibit #1 from 1964 on. (Record at 387—at 346). Furthermore, he testified that
he had never seen Koller travel across the Section 12 right-of-way until the lawsuit was filed.
(Record at 387—349). Dee Hansen further testified that Koller never hauled grain over the
Section 12 right-of-way. (Record at 387—350).
Godfrey's son, Burke Lamont Godfrey, also testified that before the lawsuit was filed,
he never saw Koller use the Section 12 right-of-way. Furthermore, he testified that previous to
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the lawsuit, there were no tracks whatsoever along the Section 12 right-of-way. (Record at
388—495-96). A. Burke Godfrey himself also testified that neither Koller, nor anyone before
him ever traveled across the claimed Section 12 right-of-way.
However, it was undisputed that since the southeast quarter of the Section 12 property
was homesteaded, the public accessed the steel trough as well as a homestead originally owned
by the Whitneys by way of a road along the Section 12 Right-of-Way. (Record at 386—123,
125-26, 140-41; Record at 387—371-72). In fact, Godfrey admitted that the Section 12 rightof-way was used when the property was first homesteaded to access the Whitney homestead.
(Record at 388—555-56). Godfrey and the other witnesses claimed that Koller did not use the
Section 12 right-of-way, but none of those witnesses disputed the evidence that the Section 12
right-of-way was used for years and years previously, when the property was first
homesteaded.
In fact, Godfrey himself admitted that the Section 12 right-of-way was used before
Koller owned the property. He then claimed "They're both closed today. They've been
closed for, for a long time." (Record at 388—556). Dee Hansen also admitted that in years
past, it was his understanding that people used the right-of-way to water their horses and other
animals at the steel trough.
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 states "A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Furthermore, section 72-5-105 states: "All public
highways once established shall continue to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order
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of the highway authorities having jurisdiction over any highway, or by other competent
authority."
At trial no party disputed that when the Section 12 property was homesteaded, and for
years afterward, the Whitneys and others used the Section 12 right-of-way to access a log
home located east of the Section 12 property, and to water their animals at the steel trough.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that no right-of-way existed along
the south boarder of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 12.
Finally, no evidence was presented to suggest that the public right-of-way was ever
abandoned by the appropriate authorities. Therefore, it continues to exist until appropriately
abandoned, regardless of the testimony that Godfrey may have farmed over it. See Utah Code
Ann. § 72-5-105. Substantial evidence does not support the trial court's finding.
IV.

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
CONCLUSION THAT NO COUNTY ROAD EXISTS ALONG THE WESTERN
EDGE OF THE WEST SIDE OF THE SECTION 18 PROPERTY.
Respecting the Section 18 County Access Road, the trial court found:
39.
Prior to the time that Roller acquired the Wendell Thompson Property in
Section 18 Property, there was evidence of travel along the West boundary of the
Godfrey Section 18 Property between Points G and E shown on Defendants' Exhibit 1.
40.

Koller acquired the Koller Section 18 Property in 1967.

41.
Godfrey's predecessor in ownership of the Godfrey Section 18 Property
was Don Anderson (Anderson).
42.
Within two (2) years after Koller acquired the Koller Section 18
Property, Anderson began cultivating up to the West line of the Godfrey Section 18
Property and obliterated any evidence of travel across the West boundary of the
Godfrey Section 18 Property and has cultivated up to that line continuously every year
until Godfrey acquired the property from Anderson and Godfrey has cultivated up to
the West line of the Godfrey Section 18 Property each and every year since Godfrey
acquired the Godfrey Section 18 Property up to the present time.
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43.
Koller has produced no evidence to establish the basis on which evidence
of travel along the West portion of the Godfrey Section 18 Property occurred or was
used prior to the time Koller acquired his Section 18 property. There is no evidence
before the Court that there was any deeded, prescriptive or Cache County right to any
easement along the G-F line on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 across the Godfrey Section
18 Property between Points F and G on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1.
(Record at 307-308).
A.

The Evidence Showed a County Road along the West Edge of Section 18.

At trial, Burke Lamont Godfrey testified that from 1969 or 1970 to the time of trial, he
never saw a road along the west side of Section 18. (Record at 388—498). He testified that he
cultivated the southeast quarter of Section 18 up to the west property line, and that until he had
a confrontation with Koller, there were no tracks there. (Record at 388—499).
In addition, A. Burke Godfrey testified at trial that he had owned the southeast quarter
of Section 18 for the last 4Vi to 6 years, and that he had never seen a roadway across the
Section 18 property. (Record at 388—539).
Dee Hansen testified that he owned the southeast quarter of Section 13, which property
is contiguous (See Attachment "1") to the west side of Section 18, and that he was on the
property every year for 33 years. (Record at 387—338, 340-41). Dee Hansen also testified
that there was a road along the west side (which constitutes the FG line on Defendants' Exhibit
" 1 " [the Section 18 County Access Road]) for one to three years after he purchased the
property. (Record at 387—353, 367). After that time, the ground was farmed over the road to
the fence on the west side. (Record at 387—354).
In sum, none of Godfrey's witnesses stated that there was no county road along the
west side of Section 18. Instead, they stated that whatever road was there, Godfrey farmed
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over. Roller himself admitted that he asked Don Anderson to plow up the road in the mideighties in order to control rye that was infesting the surrounding farms. (Record at 387—
446). Godfrey's evidence does not negate the existence of a county road.
On the other hand, evidence was introduced to show that a clear roadway existed along
the Section 18 County Access Road, and that the roadway was in fact a county road. First,
aerial photographs taken in 1946, 1959, and 1966 show how a county road, 7200 West,
traveled north along the west side of Section 19 (See Attachment #1) and up to the middle of
the west edge of Section 18. These photographs show a continuous county road traveling north
along the west edge of Section 18 and ending at the southwest corner of the northwest quarter
of Section 18; i.e. the Roller Section 18 property. (Record at 387—286-87, 289-93).
Second, the trial court acknowledged, but improperly would not receive, a county map
which showed the same 7200 West road traveling north and ending at the southwest quarter of
the Section 18 property. (Record at 387—330-31). Roller and others used that road
continuously since before 1967 for various reasons to gain ingress and egress to the Section 18
Property. It was a wide and fairly well-packed road. (Record at 386—132-33, 138-39;
Record at 3 8 7 - 265, 281, 283, 285, 423, 455, 457, 459).
Third, Roller testified that it was his understanding that the roadway along Section 18
was a county road. (Record at 386—129-130; Record at 387—289-93; Record at 388—590).
Godfrey's counsel objected to Roller's testimony regarding whether or not the road was a
county road, and the judge originally sustained the objection. However, Roller's testimony
was not improper. Rule 803(20), Utah Rules of Evidence provides for the admission of
testimony addressing "Reputation concerning boundaries or general history." The rule states
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the following not to be "excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as
a witness":
Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history
important to the community or State or nation in which located.
Utah R. Evid. 803(20).
No one questioned that Koller had been a resident of the area for many years. He was
in a position to testify as to the customs and boundaries affecting the Section 18 Property. He
testified that those in the area understood the road to be a county road, and he described the
road as having the appearance of a county road. The trial judge improperly excluded his
testimony regarding the Section 18 County Access Road.
Koller presented evidence to the trial court that the roadway along the Section 18
property was a county road. Godfrey did not present contrary evidence, but rather claimed
that the parties plowed up the road. Such evidence, however, does not negate the fact that a
county road existed. Farming over a county road does not make the road any less of a county
road. Utah law clearly requires abandonment of the road by the proper authorities, which
never took place in this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105.
B.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion when It Failed to Continue the Trial
so that Don Anderson Could Testify Regarding the Section 18 County Road.

At the second day of trial, Koller intended to call Don Anderson as a witness to testify
that the Section 18 road was a county road. (Record at 387—416-20). At the time,
Mr. Anderson had been listed as a "will call" witness by Godfrey. However, he had not been
served with a subpoena from either party. (Record at 387—417-18). Koller had previously
contacted Mr. Anderson by telephone and asked if he would be present at trial to testify as a
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witness for Koller, which he agreed to do. Furthermore, trial counsel for Roller had
previously contacted counsel for Godfrey and had been told by Godfrey's counsel that
Mr. Anderson would be testifying for Godfrey. (Record at 387—420). Roller's trial counsel
relied on that representation. (Record at 387—420).
Mr. Anderson appeared at trial, intending to testify. However, after having a
conversation with Godfrey's counsel, Mr. Anderson left the courthouse and could not
thereafter be located. When it came time for him to testify, Koller could not find him. As a
result, Koller explained the dilemma to the trial court. The court acknowledged Roller's
problem, but stated that it would stay on schedule with the trial. (Record at 387—416-20).
"Granting a motion to continue a trial is within the trial court's discretion." Holbrook
v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 (Utah App. 1994); see Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b).
Thus, "[I]n determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must review the
reasonableness of the trial court's decision, and should not disturb the decision unless it was
"clearly unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. at 299 (quoting Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15
Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah 1964)) (internal citations omitted).
Here, it is true that neither party had subpoenaed Mr. Anderson. However, once
Mr. Anderson was present in the courthouse, a subpoena became unnecessary. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 45(h) ("A person present in court . . . may be required to testify in the same manner as
if the person were in attendance upon a subpoena."). Godfrey's counsel had represented to
Roller's trial counsel that Mr. Anderson would be present, and he was, in fact, present for
some time in the courthouse. Roller relied on that representation, and further relied on the
presence of Mr. Anderson.
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Mr. Anderson was a key witness for Koller regarding the existence of a county road
along the Section 18 property. When the trial court insisted in continuing the trial as
scheduled, it eliminated crucial evidence from Roller's case. The trial court was unreasonable
in this regard. The trial should not have closed the evidence and ruled on the case until Koller
had a reasonable time to locate Mr. Anderson for testimony. Doing so unduly prejudiced
Roller's case and this prejudice was clear error.
The trial court noted its concern with its busy docket. (Record at 387—417-18).
However, it could have continued with the hearing of evidence and simply continued its
findings until it had a chance to hear Mr. Anderson's testimony. Such a result would have
preserved fairness in the proceedings and the search for truth without unduly burdening the
court's busy docket. The trial court, accordingly, acted unreasonably and arbitrarily when it
failed to allow Koller more time to locate and call Mr. Anderson as a witness.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred when it failed to recognize the 16th section line as the boundary
between the Koller and Godfrey Section 12 property. Furthermore, substantial evidence does
not support the trial court's findings that no right-of-way exists along the Section 12 Property
and that no county road exists along the west edge of the Section 18 Property. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court should vacate the trial court's findings of fact and remand for a
new trial.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Koller requests oral argument in order to more fully explain his position and respond to
questions of the Court regarding factual and legal issues.
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DATED this£?£-day of January, 1999.

M. Byron Fisher
/
Scott M. Petersen
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees the Chase
Defendants
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72-5-107.

PARTI
PUBLIC HIGHWAYS
5.101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Rights-of-way Act.*

72-5-112

1998

^5.102, Definitions.
\s> used in this part, "state highway purposes" includes:
(1) rights-of-way, including those necessary for state
highways within cities and towns;
(2) the construction, reconstruction, relocation, improvement, and maintenance of the state highways and
other highways, roads, and streets under the control of
the department;
(3) limited access facilities, including rights of access,
air, light, and view and frontage and service roads to
highways;
(4) adequate drainage in connection with any highway,
cut, fill, or channel change and the maintenance of any
highway, cut, fill, or channel change;
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage buildings
and yards, and road maintenance or construction sites;
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufacture of
road materials, and access roads to the sites;
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view of any
portion of a highway to promote the safety of the traveling
public;
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional signs,
and other signs, fences, curbs, barriers, and obstructions
for the convenience of the traveling public;
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm sewers,
sidewalks, and highway illumination;
(10) the construction and maintenance of livestock
highways; and
(11) the construction and maintenance of roadside rest
areas adjacent to or near any highway.
1998
72-5-103. Acquisition of rights-of-way and o t h e r real
property — Title to property acquired.
(1) The department may acquire any real property or interests in real property necessary for temporary, present, or
reasonable future state highway purposes by gift, agreement,
exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.
(2) Title to real property acquired by the department or the
counties, cities, and towns by gift, agreement, exchange,
purchase, condemnation, or otherwise for highway rights-ofway or other highway purposes may be in fee simple or any
lesser estate or interest.
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-ofway for which the public has only an easement passes the title
of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the

United States patents — Patentee and
c o u n t y t o a s s e r t c l a i m s to r o a d s c r o s s i n g
land.
(1) (a) If any person acquires title from the United States
to any land in this state over which any public highway
extends t h a t has not been duly platted, and t h a t has not
been continuously used as a public highway for a period of
ten years, the person shall within three months after
receipt of the person's patent assert the person's claim for
damages in writing to the county executive of the county
in which the land is situated.
(b) The county legislative body shall have an additional
period of three months in which to begin proceedings to
condemn the land according to law.
(2) (a) The highway shall continue open as a public highway during the periods described under Subsection (1).
(b) If no action is begun by the county executive within
the period described under Subsection (1Kb), the highway
shall be considered to be abandoned by the public.
(3) In case of a failure by the person so acquiring title to
public lands to assert his claim for damage during the three
months from the time the person received a patent to the
lands, the person shall thereafter be barred from asserting or
recovering any damages by reason of the public highway, and
the public highway shall remain open.
1998
72-5-108. Width of rights-of-way for public h i g h w a y s .
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set
as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or municipalities may determine for the highways under their respective jurisdiction.
1998
72-5-109.

Contributions of property by c o u n t i e s a n d
municipalities.
Counties and municipalities may contribute real or personal
property to the department for state highway purposes. 1998
72-5-110. A c q u i s i t i o n of personal property.
The department may acquire by gift, agreement, exchange,
purchase, or otherwise machinery, tools, equipment, materials, supplies, or other personal property necessary for the
administration, construction, maintenance, and operation of
the state highways, and may sell, exchange, or otherwise
dispose of the machinery, tools, equipment, materials, supplies, and other personal property when no longer suitable or
required for state highway purposes.
1998

H i g h w a y s o n c e e s t a b l i s h e d c o n t i n u e until
abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to be
highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the highway*
authorities having jurisdiction over any highway, or by other
competent authority.
1998

72-5-111. Disposal of real property.
(1) (a) If the department determines that any real property
or interest in real property, acquired for a highway
purpose, is no longer necessary for the purpose, the
department may lease, sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the real property or interest in the real property.
(b) Real property may be sold at private or public sale
and the proceeds of the sale shall be turned over to the
state treasurer and credited to the Transportation Fund.
(2) In the disposition of land at any private sale, first
consideration may be given to the original grantor or his
successor-in-interest.
(3) Any sale, exchange, or disposal of real property or
interest in real property made by the department pursuant to
this section, is exempt from the mineral reservation provisions
of Title 65A, Chapter 6, Mineral Leases, and any deed made
and delivered by the department pursuant to this section
without specific reservations in the deed is a conveyance of all
the state's right, title, and interest in the real property or
interest in the real property.
1998

72-5-106. Expiration of franchise of toll bridge or road.
If the franchise of any toll bridge or road expires by
limitation, forfeiture, or nonuser it is a free public highway,
and no claim shall be valid against the public for right-of-way
or for land or material comprising the bridge or road.
1998

72-5-112. A c q u i s i t i o n of real property from county,
city, or o t h e r political s u b d i v i s i o n — Exchange.
The department may purchase or otherwise acquire from
any county, city, or other political subdivision of the state real

highway.

1996

72-5-104. P u b l i c u s e c o n s t i t u t i n g dedication*
A highway shall be deemed to have* Deehjdedicaied and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
1996

72-5-105.
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d State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direcof the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
r a s and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appe^ 8 firom the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
6 3-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
^rits sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
1996
T

78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
1986
78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state.
1986
CHAPTERS
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction—Appeals.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Transfer of court operating responsibilities —
Facilities — Staff — Budget
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.2.
District court case management.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures.

Section
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
Reports.
78-3-21.5.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment —
Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and
responsibilities.
78-3-25.
Assistants for administrator of the courts —
Appointment of trial court executives.
78-3-26.
Courts to provide information and statistical
data to administrator of the courts.
78-3-27.
Annual judicial conference.
78-3-28.
Repealed.
78-3-29.
Presiding judge — Associate presiding judge —
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers
— Dutiesr78-3-30.
Duties of the clerk of the district court.
78-3-31.
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Appointment — Functions governed by rule.
78-3-1 t o 78-3-2.

Repealed.

1971, 1981,1988

78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified.
1988
78-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n — A p p e a l s .
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary
writs and other writs necessary to carry into effect their
orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the judgments of.the justice court and of
the small claims department of the district court.
(6) Appeals firom the final orders, judgments, and decrees of
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has
subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only
if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court
prior to July 1, 1996;

(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3Xa)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
1996
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4.

S u p r e m e Court — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s pro tempore, a n d p r a c t i c e of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds ofall members of both houses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court.
1986
78-2-7.
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78-2-3

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7JS. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 t o 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986,1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.

78-2a-l. Creation — SeaL
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
1986

78-2a-2.

N u m b e r of j u d g e s — Terms — F u n c t i o n s —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to Ihe duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
l*88
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all e%~
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary^
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from forma*
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service^ COTQXD^'
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fir 6
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Hole 39. Trial by jury or by the court.
ury

(a) fl? J - When trial by jury has been demanded as
yjded in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the
gister of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so
demanded shall be by jury, unless
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written
tipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made
. 0pen court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the
c0 urt sitting without a jury, or
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that
right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not
exist, or
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.
(b) fly the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any
o r all issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter
of right.
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1)
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present
taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the testimony
so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and
subject to the same objections that may be made with respect
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(cXl) and (2)
[Rule 32(cX3XA) and (B)].

Rule 42

court of the United States or of any state an action based on or
including the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the
plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in
the action; or
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is
without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction
of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who
has once dismissed an action in any court commences an
action based upon or including the same claim against the
same defendant, the court may make such order for the
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until
the plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party.
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (aXIXi)
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party,
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the
adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was
obtained.

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any

Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials.
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any

Rule 43
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separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
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(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these
rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. All
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
U t a h Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court.
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts
not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on
affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court
may direct t h a t the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.

existing law of the judicial tribunals thereof, is presumptive
evidence of the statute, law, proclamation, edict, decree or
ordinance. The unwritten or common law of another state, or
of a territory, or of a foreign country, may be proved as a fact
by oral evidence. The books of reports of cases adjudged in the
courts thereof must also be admitted as presumptive evidence
of the unwritten or common law thereof. The law of such state
or territory or foreign country is to be determined by the court
or master and included in the findings of the court or master
or instructions to the jury, as the case may be. Such finding or
instruction is subject to review. In determining such law,
neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court shall be limited
to the evidence produced on the trial by the parties, but may
consult any of the written authorities above named in this
subdivision, with the same force and effect as if the same had
been admitted in evidence.

R u l e 44. Proof of official r e c o r d .

Rule 45. S u b p o e n a .

(a) Authentication
of copy. An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and in the absence of judicial knowledge or competent evidence, accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is within the
United States or within a territory or insular possession
subject to the dominion of the United States, the certificate
may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or
political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated
by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer
having a seal of office and having official duties in the district
or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. If the office in which the record
is kept is in a foreign state or country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign
state or country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office.
(b) Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
t h a t after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence t h a t
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
(c) Other proof This rule does not prevent the proof of
official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any
method authorized by any applicable statute or by the rules of
evidence at common law.
(d) Certified copy of record read in evidence. A copy of any
official record, or entry therein, in the custody of a public
officer of this state, or of the United States, certified by the
officer having custody thereof, to be a full, true and correct
copy of the original in his custody, may be read in evidence in
an action or proceeding in the courts of this state, in like
manner and with like effect as the original could be if
produced.
(e) Official record defined. As used in this rule "official
record" shall mean all public writings, including laws, judicial
records, all official documents, and public records of private
writings.
(f) Proof of the law of another state, territory or foreign
country. A printed copy of a statute, or other written law of
another state, or of a territory, or of a foreign country, or a
printed copy of a proclamation, edict, decree or ordinance by
the executive power thereof, contained in a book or publication
purporting or proved to have been published by the authority
thereof, or proved to be commonly admitted as evidence of the

(a) Form; issuance.
(1) Every subpoena shall:
(A) issue from the court in which the action is pending;
(B) state the title of the action, the name of the court from
which it is issued, the name and address of the party or
attorney serving the subpoena, and its civil action number;
(C) command each person to whom it is directed to appear
to give testimony at trial, or a t hearing, or at deposition, or to
produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or
tangible things in the possession, custody or control of that
person, or to permit inspection of premises, at a time and place
therein specified; and
(D) set forth the text of Notice to Persons Served with a
Subpoena, in substantially similar form to Form 30 in the
Appendix of Forms to these rules.
(2) A command to produce or to permit inspection and
copying of documents or tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises, may be joined with a command to appear at
trial, or at hearing, or at deposition, or may be issued
separately.
(3) The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise
in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall complete it before
service. An attorney admitted to practice in the court in which
the action is pending may also issue and sign a subpoena as an
officer of the court.
(b) Service; scope.
(1) Generally.
(A) A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a
party and is not less than 18 years of age. Service of a
subpoena upon a person named therein shall be made as
provided in Rule 4(e) for the service of process and, if the
person's appearance is commanded, by tendering to that
person the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage
allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on behalf of the
United States, or this state, or any officer or agency of either,
fees and mileage need not be tendered. Prior notice of any
commanded production or inspection of documents or tangible
things or inspection of premises before trial shall be served on
each party in the manner prescribed by Rule 5(b).
(B) Proof of service when necessary shall be made by filing
with the clerk of the court from which the subpoena is issued
a statement of the date and manner of service and of the
names of the persons served, certified by the person who made
the service.
(C) Service of a subpoena outside of this state, for the
taking of a deposition or production or inspection of documents
or tangible things or inspection of premises outside this state,
shall be made in accordance with the requirements of the
jurisdiction in which such service is made.

R u l e 43. E v i d e n c e .
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(2) Subpoena for appearance at trial or hearing. A subpoena
commanding a witness to appear at a trial or at a hearing
pending in this state may be served at any place within the
state.
(3) Subpoena for taking deposition.
(A) A person who resides in this state may be required to
appear at deposition only in the county where the person
resides, or is employed, or transacts business in person, or at
such other place as the court may order. A person who does not
reside in this state may be required to appear at deposition
only in the county in this state where the person is served with
a subpoena, or at such other place as the court may order.
(B) A subpoena commanding the appearance of a witness at
a deposition may also command the person to whom it is
directed to produce or to permit inspection and copying of
documents or tangible things relating to any of the matters
within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b),
but in that event the subpoena will be subject to the provisions
of Rule 30(b) and paragraph (c) of this rule.
(4) Subpoena for production or inspection of documents or
tangible things or inspection of premises. A subpoena to
command a person who is not a party to produce or to permit
inspection and copying of documents or tangible things or to
permit inspection of premises may be served at any time after
commencement of the action. The scope and procedure shall
comply with Rule 34, except that the person must be allowed
at least 14 days to comply as stated in subparagraph (cX2XA)
of this rule. The party serving the subpoena shall pay the
reasonable cost of producing or copying the documents or
tangible things. Upon the request of any other party and the
payment of reasonable costs, the party serving the subpoena
shall provide to the requesting party copies of all documents
obtained in response to the subpoena.
(c) Protection of persons subject to subpoenas.
( D A party or an attorney responsible for the issuance and
service of a subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid
imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to that
subpoena. The court from which the subpoena was issued
shall enforce this duty and impose upon the party or attorney
in breach of this duty an appropriate sanction, which may
include, but is not limited to, lost earnings and a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(2)(A) A subpoena served upon a person who is not a party
to produce or to permit inspection and copying of documents or
tangible things or to permit inspection of premises, whether or
not joined with a command to appear at trial, or at hearing, or
at deposition, must allow the person at least 14 days after
service to comply, unless a shorter time has been ordered by
the court for good cause shown.
(B) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection
and copying of documents or tangible things or to permit
inspection of premises need not appear in person at the place
of production or inspection unless also commanded to appear
at trial, at hearing, or at deposition.
(C) A person commanded to produce or to permit inspection
and copying of documents or tangible things or inspection of
premises may, before the time specified for compliance with
the subpoena, serve upon the party or attorney designated in
the subpoena written objection to inspection or copying of any
or all of the documents or tangible things or inspection of the
premises. If objection is made, the party serving the subpoena
shall not be entitled to inspect and copy the materials or
inspect the premises except pursuant to an order of the court.
If objection has been made, the party serving the subpoena
may, upon notice to the person commanded to produce, move
at any time for an order to compel the production. Such an
order to compel production shall protect any person who is not
a party or an officer of a party from significant expense
resulting from the inspection and copying commanded.

Rule 45

(3) (A) On timely motion, the court from which a subpoena
was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it:
(i) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance;
(ii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to
appear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in
person; or requires a non-resident of this state to appear at
deposition in a county other than the county in which the
person was served;
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected
matter and no exception or waiver applies;
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.
(B) If a subpoena:
(i) requires disclosure of-a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information;
(ii) requires disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or
information not describing specific events or occurrences in
dispute and resulting from the expert's study made not at the
request of any party;
(iii) requires a resident of this state who is not a party to
appear at deposition in a county in which the resident does not
reside, or is not employed, or does not transact business in
person; or
(iv) requires a non-resident of this state who is not a party
to appear at deposition in a county other than the county in
which the person was served;
the court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by
the subpoena, quash or modify the subpoena or, if the party
serving the subpoena shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot otherwise be met without undue
hardship and assures that the person to whom the subpoena is
addressed will be reasonably compensated, the court may
order appearance or production only upon specified conditions.
(d) Duties in responding to subpoena.
( D A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course
of business or shall organize and label them to correspond
with the categories in the demand.
(2) When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on
a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial
preparation materials, the claim shall be made expressly and
shall be supported by a description of the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced that is
sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the claim.
(e) Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate
excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena
issued. An adequate cause for failure to obey exists when a
subpoena purports to require a nonparty to appear or produce
at a place not within the limits provided by subparagraph
<cX3XAXii).
(f) Procedure where witness conceals himself or fails to
attend. If a witness evades service of a subpoena, or fails to
attend after service of a subpoena, the court may issue a
warrant to the sheriff of the county to arrest the witness and
bring the witness before the court.
(g) Procedure when witness is confined in jail. If the witness
is a prisoner confined in a jail or prison within the state, an
order for examination in the prison upon deposition or, in the
discretion of the court, for temporary removal and production
before the court or officer for the purpose of being orally
examined, may be made upon motion, with or without notice,
by a justice of the Supreme Court, or by the district court of
the county in which the action is pending.
(h) Subpoena unnecessary; when. A person present in court,
or before a judicial officer, may be required to testify in the
same manner as if the person were in attendance upon a
subpoena.
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have opportunity to participate A witness so appointed shall
advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any, the witness'
deposition may be taken by any party, and the witness may be
called to testify by the court or any party The witness shall be
subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party
calling the witness
(b) Compensation Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation m whatever sum the court
may allow The compensation thus fixed is payable from funds
which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil
actions and proceedings involving just compesation under the
Fifth Amendment In other civil actions and proceedings the
compesation shall be paid by the parties m such proportion
and at such time as the court direct, and thereafter charged in
like manner as other costs
(c) Disclosure of appointment
In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact
t h a t the court appointed the expert witness
(d) Parties' experts of own selection Nothing in this rule
limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own
selection
A R T I C L E VTII. HEARSAY
Rule 8 0 1 . D e f i n i t i o n s .
The following definitions apply under this article
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
the person as an assertion
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a
statement
(c) Hearsay "Hearsay" is a statement, other t h a n one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the t r u t h of the matter asserted
(d) Statements which are not hearsay A statement is not
hearsay if
(1) Prior statement by witness The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the
statement or has forgotten or (Bu) consistent with the declara n t s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person
made after perceiving the person, or
(2) Admission by party opponent The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either
an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party
to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and m furtherance
of the conspiracy
R u l e 802. H e a r s a y rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by
these rules
R u l e 803. H e a r s a y e x c e p t i o n s ; availability of declarant
immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness
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(1) Present sense impression
A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter
(2) Excited utterance A statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition.
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat
ment Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment
(5) Recorded recollection A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge
but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the
witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly If
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
offered by an adverse party
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity A memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, m any form, of acts,
events conditions opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
busmess activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness The term "busmess" as used in this
paragraph mcludes busmess, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit
(7) Absence of entry in records kept m accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (6) Evidence that a matter is not
included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compi
lations, m any form, kept m accordance with the provisions of
Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of
the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness
(8) Public records and reports Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, m any form, of public offices or
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency,
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however,
m criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other
law enforcement personnel, or (C) m civil actions and proceedings and against the Government m criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness
(9) Records of vital statistics Records or data compilations,
in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the
report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law
(10) Absence of public record or entry Do prove the absence
of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of
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w hich

a record, report, statement, or data compilation m any
form, was regularly made and preserved by a pubhc office or
agency, evidence m the form of a certification in accordance
^ith Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to
d^close the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or

(22) Judgment of previous conviction Evidence of a final
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not
upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
y^ar, to prove any fact essential to sustam the judgment, but

(11) Records of religious organization Statements of births,
jjjarnages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship
w blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or
family history, contained m a regularly kept record of a
rtfkgious organization
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates Statements of fact contained m a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a
g^crament, made by a clergyman, pubhc official, or other
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious
organization or by law to perform the act certified, and
piirportmg to have been issued at the time of the act or within
a reasonable time thereafter
(13) Family records Statements of fact concerning personal
0{ family history contained m family Bibles, genealogies,
charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
efigravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property
Tfie record of a document purporting to establish or affect an
^ e r e s t in property, as proof of the content of the original
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each
person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the
record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute
authorizes the recording of documents of that kind m that
0 #ce
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in prop
efty A statement contained in a document purporting to
establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated
^as relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings
^rith the property since the document was made have been
^consistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of
tJie document
(16) Statements in ancient documents Statements m a
document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity
0f which is established
(17) Market reports commercial publications Market quotations tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the pubhc or by
persons in particular occupations
(18) Learned treatises To the extent called to the attention
of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by
t|ie expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a
subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established
ag a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the
fitness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice If
admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may
n ot be received as exhibits
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history Reputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage,
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family
history
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history
Reputation m a community arising before the controversy, as
to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community,
and reputation as to events of general history important to the
community or State or nation in which located
(21) Reputation as to character Reputation of a person's
character among associates or in the community

prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused The pendency of an
appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or
boundaries Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family
of general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if
the same would be provable by evidence of reputation
(24) Other exceptions A statement not specifically covered
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact, (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the
general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent ofTt makes known to the adverse
p#rty sufficiently m advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability "Unavailability as a witness" mcludes situations m which the declarant
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement, or
(2) persists m refusing to testify concerning the subject
matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the
court to do so, or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the
declarant's statement, or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or
infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the
declarant's statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption,
refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to
the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying
(b) Hearsay exceptions The following 'are not excluded by
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness
(1) Former testimony Testimony given as a witness at
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or m a
depa&itu&L taken, ux cato$Ua3\c& ^vth. law ux tha caviies. <iC tlue,
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, m a civil action or proceeding, a
predecessor m interest, had an opportunity and similar motive
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination
(2) Statement under belief of impending death In a civil or
criminal action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent,
if the judge finds it was made m good faith
(3) Statement against interest A statement which was at
the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's

Tab 3

TRIAL COURT
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW;
JUDGMENT AND
DECREE

L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
56 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
EVAN 0. ROLLER,
FINDINGS OF FACT A N D
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs ,
F. B U R K E G O D F R E Y , B . L A M O N T
GODFREY and BURKE'S UTAH LAND
AND LIVESTOCK, L L C , a Utah
Limited Liability Company,

Civil N o .

92-118

Defendants.

This
May,
the

matter

came

o n f o r trial

1 9 9 7 in t h e D i s t r i c t
Honorable

Judge

Courtroom

Gordon

o n the 22nd

a n d 23rd

d a y s of

in L o g a n , C a c h e C o u n t y ,

J. L o w p r e s i d i n g .

Utah,

The Plaintiff was

present

in p e r s o n a n d w a s r e p r e s e n t e d b y h i s A t t o r n e y , R a y m o n d N .

Malouf.

T h e D e f e n d a n t s w e r e p r e s e n t in p e r s o n a n d w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d

by

their

Witnesses

Attorneys,
were

sworn

Olson

& Hoggan,

and testified.

P . C , L. Brent
Glen

Hoggan.

Thompson,

whose

deposition was taken on February 17, 1993 was not available for
health reasons to testify at the trial.
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l«K*C£NTER
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The deposition of Glen

C

Thompson taken February 17, 1993 was published and accepted as
evidence on motion of Plaintiff and was read by the Trial Judge
prior to his bench ruling in this case.

Documentary evidence was
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presented, the matter was argued by counsel for the Plaintiff and
• ^ O N
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the Court having heard the testimony, having read the deposition of

•ICx 1 1 5

.Glen Thompson, having examined the physical- evidence
MED
- - ^ ^ . ^and having
r^-GQ?

14017s-

2
heard the arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and being fully advised
in the premises, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff resides near Cornish, Cache County, Utah.

2.

The Defendants are residents of Clarkston, Cache County,

3.,

The

Utah.
property

subject

of

this

action

is

situated

in

Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian (the Section 12 Property) and in Section 18, Township 14
North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian

(the Section 18

Property).
4.

The Defendant, Burke's Utah Land and Livestock, LLC, is

the owner of the East Half of the Northeast Quarter and the North
Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Section 12 Property

(the

Godfrey Section 12 Property).
5.

Plaintiff is the owner of the Southeast Quarter of the

Southeast Quarter of the Section 12 Property (the Roller Section 12
Property).
6.

On March 29, 1991 the Utah State Water Engineer granted

an application of Plaintiff to develop a spring situated on the
Northeast

Quarter

of

the Southeast

Quarter

of

the

Section

12

Property (the Spring) . In pursuit of access to the Spring for the
purpose of developing the same, Plaintiff filed this action to,
among other things, condemn an easement on the property wherein the
Spring is situated, and to obtain an order o^ this Court granting
Plaintiff

the right

develop the Spring.

to come upon

said property

of Godfrey to

This Court granted Plaintiff an order of

occupancy to develop the Spring.

Development of the Spring was

completed in approximately October of 1992.
7.

The area reasonably required to develop the Spring is 900

feet North and South and 600 feet East and West (the Spring Area)
and is particularly described as follows:

3
Beginning 595 feet West of the railroad post located at
the Section 12 16th corner point on the East side of the
adjoining Roller and Godfrey properties in Section 12,
Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
thence North 900 feet, thence West 600 feet, thence South
900 feet, thence East 600 feet along the Koller/Godfrey
Section 12 boundary to beginning.
8.

The use to which the Spring Area is to be applied by

Plaintiff is a use authorized by law.
9.

The taking of an easement on the Spring Area by Plaintiff

is necessary to Plaintiff's development, use and maintenance of the
Spring.
10.
to

The construction of the collection and piping system used

develop

the

Spring

in

the

Spring

Area

commenced

and

was

completed by Plaintiff within a reasonable time after Plaintiff
initiated this action.
11.

The Spring has not been applied to any public use other

than Plaintiff's use.
12.

Plaintiff does not require the fee simple title to the

Spring Area in order to develop the Spring or to beneficially use
the water from the Spring but rather requires only an easement on
the Spring Area for such development, use and maintenance upon the
payment of damages for any injury to the surface of the Spring Area
resulting

from

the

installation

and

maintenance

of

the

paraphernalia installed to develop the Spring and to transfer water
from the Spring across the property of Defendant.
retain the surface rights to the Spring Area.

Defendant should
The easement for

Plaintiff to use the Spring Area to develop the Spring should
expire in the event the Plaintiff fails to make the necessary proof
to the Utah State Water Engineer

to perfect

the water

rights

granted to Plaintiff in the Spring or in the event Plaintiff's
water rights in the Spring are perfected and thereafter lost by the
Plaintiff or his successors in ownership for any reason.
13.

Defendants have waived compensation for surface damage to

the Spring Area caused by Plaintiff
Spring.

in his development of the

Such waiver does not include the waiver of any damage to

4
the surface of the Spring Area which may be caused by Plaintiff or
his successors hereafter.
14 .
Area

The air relief valve installed by Plaintiff on the Spring

in connection with Plaintiff's

development

of the

Spring

unnecessarily injures Defendants and should and can be removed from
Godfrey's Section 12 Property.
15.

Shirleen T. Clark, Beth T. Williams, Venna T. Godfrey and

Glen Norman Thompson are the owners of the Southwest Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter of the Section 12 Property (the Clark Property).
Shirleen T. Clark, Beth T. Williams, Venna T. Godfrey and Glen
Norman Thompson are the children of Glen Thompson who owned the
Clark Section 12 Property prior to Shirleen T. Clark, Beth T.
Williams, Venna T. Godfrey and Glen Norman Thompson.
16.

Roller acquired title to the Roller Section 12 Property

and the Roller Section 18 Property by a Warranty Deed from Lillie
B.

Thompson, a copy of which was introduced and received

into

evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 101 (the Thompson-Roller Deed).
The Thompson-Roller Deed makes no reference to easements or rights
of way.
17.

Lillie B. Thompson acquired title to the Roller Section

12 and Section 18 Property by a Decree of Distribution in the
Matter of the Estate of Wendell Thompson, the husband of Lillie B.
Thompson.

A copy of the Decree of Distribution in the Matter of

the Estate of Wendell Thompson was introduced and received into
evidence
Decree).

as

Defendant's

Exhibit

No.

20

(the Wendell

Thompson

The Wendell Thompson Decree makes no mention of or

reference to any easement or right-of-way.
18.

Wendell Thompson acquired title to the Roller Section 12

and Section 18 Property by Warranty Deed from Renneth Thompson and
Peru Thompson, a copy of which was introduced and received into
evidence

as

Defendant's

Exhibit

No.

21

(the

Renneth

Thompson/Wendell Thompson Deed).
19.

The Renneth Thompson/Wendell Thompson Deed provides on

its face that:

5
11

It is the intent of this conveyance also to convey to
the Grantee all of the right which the Grantors have or
claim in and to a certain spring, its pipeline, all
rights-of-way used in connection therewith, together with
all rights used in connection with said spring, also to
convey to the Grantee all of the right, title and
interest of Grantors to a steel watering trough used to
collect said water and to facilitate its use, said
watering trough being situated in the Northwest Corner of
the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of said
Section 12."
20.

The Kenneth

Thompson/Wendell

Thompson

Deed

makes no

reference to an easement for ingress and egress across the Godfrey
Property and Plaintiff produced no evidence at trial to indicate
that the rights-of-way referred to in the Kenneth Thompson/Wendell
Thompson Deed referred to Plaintiff's claimed easement for ingress
and egress across the Godfrey Section 12 Property.
21.

A copy of a Quit Claim Deed from Kenneth Thompson and

Peru Thompson, his wife, to Glen W. Thompson was introduced into
evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13.

Said Quit Claim Deed

conveys:
"The right to water livestock consisting principally
of work animals at a steel watering trough situated in
the Northwest Corner of the Southeast Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 14 North, Range
2 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; together with
the right of ingress and egress to said steel watering
trough for the purpose of carrying the right hereby
conveyed into effect.
It being understood and agreed
that this right is not exclusive, but is to be exercised
in connection with similar rights of other parties and
subject
to reasonable
care to avoid
unnecessary
interference with the rights of other parties to a like
service."
This Quit Claim Deed makes no reference to an easement for ingress
*4H0GGAN. P C

and egress across the Godfrey Section 12 Property and no evidence
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was presented by Plaintiff to show that the rights conveyed thereby
made any reference to Plaintiffs' claimed easement for ingress and
egress across the Godfrey Section 12 Property.
22.

For more than eighty (80) years last past there has been

23 EAST M A I N
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a marker at Point C on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 in the form of a

6
railroad tie imbedded vertically in the ground approximately three
feet (3') and protruding from the ground approximately five feet
(5').

This railroad tie marks the Northeast Corner of the Roller

Section 12 Property and the Southeast Corner of the Godfrey Section
12 Property.
23.

At

Point

B

on

Defendants'

Exhibit

No.

1,

there

historically existed a steel watering trough which is shown on
Plaintiff's Exhibit No.'s 229, 230, 231 and 233

(the trough) in

such a way so as to enable horses owned by Godfrey's predecessor's
in

interest

to water

therefrom,

for horses

owned by

Roller's

predecessor's in interest to water therefrom and for horses owned
by Clark's predecessor's in interest to water therefrom.
24.

The trough was situated in the Northwest Corner of the

Roller Section 12 Property,

the Northeast

Corner of the Clark

Property and on the Godfrey Section 12 Property.
25.

There

is

a

square

pipe

imbedded

in

the

approximately Point A on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1.

ground

at

This square

pipe replaced a wooden post in the exact same location and the post
and pipe in succession have been in the present location of the
square pipe for more than eight (80) years last past.
26.

The square pipe at Point A on Defendant's Exhibit No. 1

marks the recognized boundary between the Northwest Corner of the
Clark Property and the Southwest Corner of the Godfrey Section 12
Property.
27.

There historically existed a fence from Point A through

Point B to Point C on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1.

Said fence

existed from more than eighty (80) years ago up to the time when it
was gradually and piece by piece removed by the owners of the
property on either side thereof.

Said fence will be hereinafter

referred to as the ABC Fence.
28.

The ABC Fence extended over approximately

the middle

going North and South of the trough at a point on the South side of
the old grain drill on the East and North side of the trough as
shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit No.'s 229, 230, 231 and 233.
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29.

Rollers and Clarks and their respective predecessors in

ownership

and

interest

of

the

Clark

and

Roller

Properties

cultivated up to the ABC Fence on the North and Godfreys and their
predecessor in interest cultivated up to the ABC Fence on the South
of the Godfrey Property and Godfreys and their predecessors in
interest and Rollers and Clarks and their predecessors in interest
recognized and treated the ABC Fence as the boundary line between
their respective properties from more than eighty (80) years ago
until the dispute giving rise to this action came about.
30.

The

Court

finds

that

the

ABC

Fence

line

marks

the

historical and recognized boundary between the Godfrey Section 12
Property on the North and the Roller Section 12 and Clark Property
on the South.
31.

The legal description ABC Fence line was established by

a survey made by Hansen and Associates, Inc. on April 20, 1995
which

survey

was

introduced

and

received

into

evidence

as

Defendants' Exhibit No. 2. The ABC Fence line is legally described
as follows:
Fence Line
A line projected through two fence post, a rail road tie
post at the East end and a square pipe at the West end,
shown to us in the field by Burke Godfrey.
Said line
described as follows:
Beginning at a point located North 00°10'32 n East along
the center of Section line as currently monumented
1300.82 feet from the aluminum cap monument found at the
South Quarter Corner of Section 12, Township 14 North,
Range 2 West, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and
running thence North 89°37'37 n East through two fence
post 2660.11 feet to the East line of said Section.
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32.
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In addition, the Court finds that Defendant, F. Burke

Godfrey, the Plaintiff, Randy Bott (Bott) a Utah licensed surveyor
and his assistant Don Williams
Property "eight
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26,

(8) or nine

(Williams), met on the Section 12

(9) years ago" and prior to December

1989; that Bott, Plaintiff and F. Burke Godfrey met at the
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( point
,

where the railroad tie is situated at Point C on Defendants'

8
Exhibit No. 1 and there, with a surveying instrument belonging to
and provided by Bott, sited a line from said railroad tie straight
to the square pipe located at Point A on the ABC Fence line where
Williams was holding a siting stick and that Plaintiff and F. Burke
Godfrey then and there agreed that the ABC Fence line as cited by
Bott and observed by Plaintiff and

F. Burke Godfrey would be the

boundary line between Godfrey's Section 12 Property and Roller's
Section 12 Property.

Glen 6oafircy,Jwho was the owner of the Clark

Property at the time his deposition was taken on February 17, 1993,
stated in his deposition that the A and B line on Defendants'
Exhibit No. 1 was the boundary line between the Clark Property on
the South and the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of the
Section 12 Property on the North.
ij

33.

The Court finds that the agreement referred to in Finding

. No. 32 above is cumulative to the establishment of the ABC Fence
jl

M line as the boundary between the Godfrey Section 12 Property on the
I
ji North and the Roller Section 12 and Clark Properties on the South
(| and that the evidence conclusively established the ABC Fence line
i as such boundary line independent of the agreement made by Godfrey
and Roller at the meeting referred to in Finding of Fact No. 32.
34.

The steel post with flags attached to them shown on

Plaintiff's Exhibits 229, 230, 231, 232, and 233 and the telephone
pole shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 235 are not on the ABC Fence
line, were not placed as shown on said Exhibits in the presence of
any of the Defendants and do not mark or define the location of the
ABC Fence line.
35.

The boundaries

established

by the ABC Fence

line on

, Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 between the Godfrey Section 12 Property
fr* HOGG A N

• and the property of Plaintiff in Section 7, Township 14 North,

PC
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-i Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, should be marked by telephone
poles to be set by the Defendants at the following points:

. »cx 525
fr .'AH 8 4 3 2 3 0 5 2 5
U

A.

752 1551

fONTON OFFICE
ULAST M A I N
I ' 3 BOX 1 1 5
**0N UTAM 8 4 3 3 7

| * ' 257 3885

',
J

Immediately South of the Northeast corner of

Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake

Meridian.

B.

Point

C

At the exact point where the railroad tie at
on Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 is presently

situated.
C.

At

some points between the telephone

poles

provided in A. and B. above so that the boundary line
between those two (2) telephone poles can be sited from
pole to pole.
D.

Adjoining on the North of the square pipe at

Point A on Defendants' Exhibit No. 2.
E.

Somewhere

along

the

ABC

Fence

line

at

Defendants' election.
36.

Defendants should be allowed to use the telephone pole

belonging to Plaintiff and situated at approximately Point B on
Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 as one of the telephone poles to be set
pursuant to Finding No. 35.
37.
way

Roller has claimed a prescriptive easement or right-of-

by prescription

or otherwise

over

the Godfrey

Section 12

Property immediately North of the ABC Fence line.
38.

Roller has failed to show by a preponderance

evidence or at all the existence of such claimed

of the

prescriptive

easement and the Court finds that Roller has no prescriptive or
other kind of easement across the Godfrey Section 12 Property.
39.

Prior

to

the

time

that

Roller

acquired

the

Wendell

Thompson Property in Section 18 Property, there was evidence of
travel along the West boundary of the Godfrey Section 18 Property
between Points G and E shown on Defendants' Exhibit 1.
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40.

Roller acquired the Roller Section 18 Property in 1967.

41.

Godfrey's predecessor in ownership of the Godfrey Section

18 Property was Don Anderson (Anderson).
42.

Within two

(2) years after Roller acquired the Roller

Section 18 Property, Anderson began cultivating up to the West line
of the Godfrey Section 18 Property and obliterated any evidence of
travel across the West boundary of the Godfrey Section 18 Property

I *3 EAST M A I N
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and has cultivated up to that line continuously every year until
Godfrey

acquired

the

property

from

Anderson

and

Godfrey

has

10
cultivated up to the West line of the Godfrey Section 18 Property
each and every year since Godfrey acquired the Godfrey Section is
Property up to the present time.
43.

Roller has produced no evidence to establish the basis on

which evidence of travel along the West portion of the Godfrey
Section 18 Property occurred or was used prior to the time Roller
acquired his Section 18 Property.

There is no evidence before the

Court that there was any deeded, prescriptive or Cache County right
to any easement along the G-F line on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1
11 across

the Godfrey

Section

18 Property prior

to the time

that

I! Roller acquired Roller's Section 18 Property.
n
11

44.

I evidence

Roller has failed to establish by preponderance of the
or

at

all that

he

or

those

acting

under

him

have

!

| established a prescriptive easement by continuous open and adverse

.'use under a claim of right for the prescriptive period over the
J western portion of Godfrey's Section 18 Property between Points F
;i and G on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1.
i

45.

There are common boundaries between the Roller Section 12

'! Property

and the Godfrey

Section

12 Property

and between the

Godfrey Section 12 Property and property owned by Roller in Section
, 7, Township 14 North, Range 1 West.

These boundaries are shown by

a blue marker on Defendants' Exhibit No. 1.

In addition, there is

a common boundary between the Roller Section 18 Property and the
;' Godfrey

Section

18 Property

as marked

in blue

on Defendants'

Exhibit No. 1 and between other Roller property and property not
owned but being operated by Godfrey.
,|

46.

Roller

has encroached

upon

various

!

, and/or being operated by Godfrey with chemical

f^SHOGGAN P C

47.
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Godfreys have waived their claims of damages prior to the

§.

48.
finds

The encroachment by Roller is without right and the Court

that

Roller

and Godfrey

each

should

encroaching upon property of the other
^TON UTAH84337 j trespass or any other means whatever.
I*') 257 3885

spray which has

trial of this case for such encroachment and crop destruction.
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damaged crops owned by Godfrey.
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properties

J

I

be restrained

by spraying,

from

physical

11
49.

Defendants

have

not

defended

Plaintiff's

claim

nor

pursued any of their claims herein in bad faith.
50.

Plaintiff

is

not

entitled

to

any

damages

against

Defendants or any of them.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A decree should enter granting Plaintiff an easement on

the Spring Area as described in Findings of Fact No. 7, for the
purpose

of

developing

and

maintaining

the

drains,

collection

facilities and water lines installed by Plaintiff in connection
with the development of the Spring.
2.

A decree should enter that Defendants have and retain the

surface rights to the Spring Area.
3.

A decree should enter that the easement granted by the

Court to develop the Spring will expire in the event Plaintiff
fails to make the necessary proof to the Utah State Water Engineer
to perfect the water rights granted to the Plaintiff in the Spring
or

in

the

event

Plaintiff's

water

rights

in

the

Spring

are

perfected and thereafter lost by the Plaintiff or his successor in
ownership for any reason.
4.
damage

Based upon Defendants' waiver of compensation for surface
to

the

Spring

Area

by

Plaintiff

while

installing

a

collection system and line to convey water from the Spring to the
Property

of

Plaintiff,

a decree

should

enter

that

Defendants

receive no damage for Plaintiff's prior actions in development of
the Spring Area.
5.

A decree should enter that Defendants' waiver of damages

to the surface of the Spring Area during and as a result of
Plaintiff's development of the Spring in the year 1992 does not
waive any damage which may be caused by Plaintiff or his successors
hereafter and that Defendants and their successors shall have the

12
right to be compensated for any damages resulting to the surface of
the

Spring

Area

as a result

of the acts

by Plaintiff, his

successors and/or those acting under Plaintiff or his successors
hereafter.
6.

A decree should enter ordering Plaintiff to remove the

air relief valve from the Defendants' property.
7.

A

decree

should

enter

that

the ABC

Fence

line

particularly described by meets and bounds in paragraph 31 of the
foregoing Findings of Fact is the boundary line between the Godfrey
Section

12 Property

on the North

and the Roller

Section 12

Properties and the Clark Property on the South.
8.

A decree should enter requiring Defendants to mark the

boundaries between the Godfrey Section 12 Property and the property
M of Plaintiff in Section 7, Township 14 North, Range 1 West, Salt
i| Lake

Meridian,

as provided

in paragraph

35 of the foregoing

J Findings of Fact.
!l

9.

A decree should enter that Plaintiff has no easement

'| either by prescriptive use or deed over the Godfrey Section 12
!

j Property.

!;

10. A

decree

should

enter

permanently

enjoining

and

•; restraining Roller and any claiming by, under or through him from
! traveling by any means across the Godfrey Section 12 Property other
• than for the purposes of developing and maintaining improvements in
,[ connection with Plaintiff's development of the Spring and then
j limited specifically to the Spring Area.
!|

11. A decree should enter that Roller has no easement by deed

or prescription across the Godfrey Section 18 Property.
j|

12. A decree should enter permanently in restraining and
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Plaintiff

and all claiming

by, under

and through

II Plaintiff from traveling by any means across the Godfrey Section 18
i, p r 0 p e r t y .
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13. A decree should enter enjoining and restraining each of
the parties from encroaching upon the properties owned or being
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j. operated by the other by spraying, physical trespass or any other
•

.
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14. A decree should enter that Defendants defense of
Plaintiff's claim or pursuit of any of their claims herein were not
taken or maintained in bad faith.
15. A decree should enter that the Plaintiff is not entitled
to any damage against Defendants or either of them.
Let judgment enter accordingly.
DATED this

v

LBH/ct

v-

godfrey f c f v
N-4894
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Hon J"./Low
istrict Court Judge

L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
56 West Center
P. 0. B o x 525
Logan, Utah
84323-0525
Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN A N D FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
EVAN O. ROLLER,
JUDGMENT A N D DECREE
Plaintiff,
vs .
F. BURKE GODFREY, B. LAMONT
GODFREY and BURKE'S UTAH LAND
A N D LIVESTOCK, L L C , a Utah
Limited Liability Company,
Civil N o . 92-118
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on the 22nd and 23rd days of
May, 1997 in the District Courtroom in Logan, Cache County, Utah,
the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low presiding.

The Plaintiff was

present in person and was represented b y his Attorney, Raymond N.
Malouf.
by

The Defendants were present in person and were represented

their

Attorneys,

Witnesses

were

Olson

sworn

and

&

Hoggan,

testified.

P . C , L.
Glen

Brent

Hoggan.

Thompson,

whose

deposition was taken on February 1 7 , 1993 w a s not available for
health reasons to testify at the trial.
•IHOGGAN. P

C.
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Thompson

taken February

The deposition of Glen

1 7 , 1993 w a s published

and accepted as

evidence on motion of Plaintiff and was read b y the Trial Judge
p r i o r to his bench ruling in this case.

Documentary evidence was

f 752 1 5 5 1

presented, the matter was argued by counsel for the Plaintiff and
fCNTON O F F I C E
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the Court having heard the testimony, having read the deposition of
Glen Thompson, having examined the physical;- evidence and having
~* ^"~ V ^£ ^
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2
heard the arguments of Plaintiff's counsel, and being fully advised
in the premises, and the Court having heretofore made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters
the following:
JUDGMENT AflD DECREE
It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows:
1.
That Plaintiff be and is hereby granted an easement on
the Spring Area described as follows:
Beginning 595 feet West of the railroad post located at
the Section 12 16th corner point on the East side of the
adjoining Roller and Godfrey properties in Section 12,
Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
thence North 900 feet, thence West 600 feet, thence South
900 feet, thence East 600 feet along the Roller/Godfrey
Section 12 boundary to beginning.
for the purpose of developing the drains, collection facilities and
water lines installed by Plaintiff in connection with development
[I of said Spring on said Spring Area.
ij

2.

That Defendants shall have and retain the surface rights

ij to the Spring Area shown on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
|

3.

The easement granted to Plaintiff pursuant to paragraph

i; 1 above will expire

in the event Plaintiff

fails to make the

, necessary proof to the Utah State Water Engineer to perfect the
j water

rights

granted

to the Plaintiff

in the Spring

on the

I j Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township
i| 2 West, Range 14 North, Salt Lak$ Base and Meridian, or in the
I. event Plaintiff's water rights in said Spring are perfected and
|5,

thereafter lost by the Plaintiff or his successor

in ownership

for

,| any reason.
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4.
,' damage

Based upon Defendant's waiver of compensation for surface
to the Spring

Area

by Plaintiff

while

installing

a

collecting system and line to convey water from said Spring to the
,' Property of Plaintiff, it is ordered that Defendants receive no

f'3NT0N OFFICE
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|, damage prior to the date of this Decree for Plaintiff's development
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'' of the Spring in said Spring Area.

5.

The prohibition provided in paragraph 4 hereof shall not

constitute a waiver of Defendants' right to damages to the surface
of

said

Spring

Area

hereafter

and

that

Defendants

and

their

successors in interest shall have the right to be compensated for
any damages resulting to the surface of said Spring Area as a
result of the acts of Plaintiff or his successors and those acting
under the Plaintiff or his successors hereafter.
6.

Plaintiff is ordered to forthwith remove the air relief

valve installed by him on Defendants' property in the Northeast
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 2 West,
Range 14 North, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
7.

The following described line:

Fence Line
A line projected through two fence post, a rail road tie
post at the East end and a square pipe at the West end,
shown to us in the field by Burke Godfrey.
Said line
described as follows:
Beginning at a point located North 00°10'32n East along
the center of Section line as currently monumented
1300.82 feet from the aluminum cap monument found at the
South Quarter Corner of Section 12, Township 14 North,
Range 2 West, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and
running thence North 89°37'37" East through two fence
post 2660.11 feet to the East line of said Section.
shall be and is hereby fixed as the boundary line between the North
Half of the Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 2 West, Range
14 North, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and the North line of the
South Half of the Northeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 2 West,
Range 14 North, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
8.

t
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Defendants

established

pursuant

are

ordered

to paragraph

to

mark

7 above

the

boundary

lines

by

telephone

poles

installed as follows:
A.

At the West terminus of said division line.

B.

At the East end of said division line.

C.

At
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such

locations

Defendants may elect.

along

said

division

line

as

4
In addition, Defendants are ordered to mark the boundary line
between property belonging to Burke's Utah Land and Livestock, LLC
in Section 12, Township 2 West, Range 14 North, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian and the property of Plaintiff in Section 7, Township 1
West, Range 14, Salt Lake Base and Meridian by telephone poles
installed as follows:
D.

Immediately South of the Northeast corner of Section

12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian.
E.

At some point between the telephone poles provided

in paragraph

8.B. and D. above so that the boundary line

between those two (2) telephone poles can be sited from point
to point.
9.

That Defendants be and are allowed to use the telephone

pole situated at approximately Point B on Defendants' Exhibit No.
1 and shown on Plaintiff's Exhibits 235 and 237 as one of the poles
to be set pursuant to subparagraphs A. and B. of paragraph 8 of
this Judgment and Decree.
10.

That Plaintiff and those claiming by, under or through

Plaintiff have no prescriptive easement across property belonging
to the Defendants in Section 12, Township 14 North, Range 2 West of
the Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
11.
Plaintiff
restrained

That Plaintiff and those claiming by, under or through
are hereby perpetually

and permanently

enjoined

and

from traveling by any means across the property of

Defendants in Section 12 other than for the purpose of developing
and maintaining improvements on the Spring Area as defined in this
Judgment and Decree and then only upon said Spring Area.
12.

That Plaintiff has no easement by deed or prescription

across the following described property belonging to Burke's Utah
Land and Livestock, LLC:
The Southwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 14 North, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
(The Godfrey
Section 18 Property).

13.

Plaintiff

and

all

claiming

by,

under

and

through

Plaintiff are perpetually and permanently enjoined and restrained
from coming upon and/or traveling by any means across the Godfrey
Section 18 Property.
14.
restrained

Each of the Plaintiff and the Defendants are enjoined and
from

encroaching

on

the

properties

owned

or

being

l| operated by the other by spraying, physical trespassing, or any
other means whatever.
15.

Defendants defense of Plaintiff's claims and pursuit of

Defendants' claims herein were not taken, initiated or maintained
in bad faith.
16.

That Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages against

Defendants or either of them.
DATED this

Jj-Uday of July, 1997.

"Gordon*" J. Low
District Court Judge
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